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This paper analyzes the relationship between the political cycle, the real 
exchange rate and the aggregate supply in Mexico. The period under 
analysis goes from 1981 to 2007, in which there were five presidential 
elections: 1982, 1988, 1994, 2000 and 2006. Significant evidence is found 
of a real appreciation of the peso, an increase in imports and an increase 
in the aggregate supply in the late months of each Presidential term, 
followed by a depreciation of the peso, a contraction of imports and a 
contraction in the  aggregate supply in the first months of the new 
administration. Some conclusions and implications are discussed, as well 
as some lines for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to show that there is a relationship 
between the political cycle and the real exchange rate in Mexico; and, on the other hand, 
this pattern influence the aggregate supply of the Mexican economy by increasing the 
import component of the supply in the months previous to elections and changes in the 
presidential administrations. 
 
In addition to contribute to the better understanding of the Mexican economy, the 
identification of this pattern is especially relevant for firms operating in Mexico, in 
particular for those in the export sector, or in industries facing competition from imports. 
 
In previous work (Gámez, 2010) it has been shown that the Mexican economy follows the 
political business cycle, but in a “partial” way; that is, there is a contraction in the 
economic activity after elections and changes of federal administrations (the so-called 
“curse of the first year”), but there is not an expansion before. 
 
In this paper it is shown that there is an expansion before elections and changes of 
government, but this expansion is not reflected in an increase of the GDP, but in an 
increase in the aggregate supply, due to an increase in imports. This increase in imports, 
in turn, is caused by the appreciation of the real exchange rate that takes place in the 
final months of each presidential administration. 
                                                          
* Dr. Cesáreo Gámez. Facultad de Economía, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, México 
cesareo.gamezgr@uanl.edu.mx 
 
Gámez 
23 
 
The relevance of the evidence found in this paper goes beyond the Mexican case. As will 
be shown in the empirical evidence review, in several countries, mainly in Latin America, 
it has been found a relationship between the political cycle and the behavior of the real 
exchange rate. The analysis presented here of the relationship between the exchange 
rate and the aggregate supply can be extended to these countries, or others in similar 
circumstances. 
 
The period under analysis goes from 1981 to 2007, in which there were five presidential 
elections: 1982, 1988, 1994, 2000 and 2006. For each election, the behavior of the real 
exchange rate and aggregate supply is analyzed in a window of 37 months, or 13 
quarters around the election dates, which in Mexico take place in July of the electoral 
years. 
 
The paper is presented in four parts: in the first one an overview of the theoretical 
framework and empirical evidence is presented, the second part shows the analysis of 
the real exchange rate, the third part presents the analysis of the aggregate supply and, 
finally, some conclusions are discussed, as well as some lines for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Generally speaking, the theoretical framework that supports this investigation is the so-
called political business cycle theory, which studies the influence that political events 
have over some economic variables. 
 
This theory started with the seminal paper by Nordhaus (1975), in which the main 
assumptions over the behavior of the involved agents are set, assumptions that, with 
some variations, remain until the present. The logic behind the theory is quite simple: 
starts with the fact that the state of the economy before an election influences the mood 
and preferences of the voters. If the economy is doing well, the voters will award the 
political party in power in the elections by voting for them, if the economy is doing poorly, 
the voters will “punish” the party in power; in other words, the state of the economy 
influences the probability of victory of the party in power. 
 
If that is so, and the politicians in power know it, they have a powerful incentive to 
improve, even in a transitory and artificial way, the state of the economy in the period 
before elections, in order to increase their probabilities of an electoral victory. These 
expansions in pre-electoral months, followed by the slowing down in the post-electoral 
period, are the political business cycle. 
 
The relationship between political cycles and aggregate supply can be traced to Lindbeck 
(1976), who stated that voters are interested in their real income, and its rate of change. 
As a result, this author stresses the importance of introducing of the real disposable 
income and/or its rate of change in the popularity function because of the ease and 
speed by which governments can “buy” popularity by rising temporarily real income by 
increasing transfers and public consumption, but also by increasing aggregate supply by 
cheaper imports.  
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Assael and Larraín (1994) develop a formal model for an open economy, where the 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment is affected by the possibility to manipulate 
the exchange rate. Such a framework opens a set of scenarios for inflation, output and 
unemployment around elections. A likely outcome in these circumstances is declining 
inflation and an appreciation of the real exchange rate before elections. 
 
Frieden and Stein (2000) identify a series of factors that influence the determination of 
the exchange rate policy in Latin American countries. Among these are the economic 
structure of the country, the macroeconomic conditions in a given moment, the pressures 
of various interest groups, the institutional environment and the political schedule. 
 
Regarding this last factor, these authors list some reasons because of which the political 
cycle, and specially the electoral schedule can have a significant effect in the exchange 
rate policy and the real exchange rate. First of all, the income effect associated with a 
depreciation of the local currency in the purchasing power of the population make 
devaluations or depreciations of the currency a very unpopular measure and, because of 
that, incumbent politicians try to avoid them (or delay them) in period before elections. 
 
A second reason for the unpopularity of a depreciation of the currency is the fact that, this 
generally induces a higher rate of inflation, which also has an unpopular effect, which 
tends to be reflected in the electoral outcome. As a consequence of this, incumbent 
governments have a strong motivation to launch price stabilization programs in pre-
electoral periods, frequently based in the use of the exchange rate as an “anchor”, which 
cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate before elections, with the consequent 
adjustment after. 
 
An additional reason has to do with the “signaling” of competence by incumbent 
governments. In the perception of common citizens, the competence of governments is 
associated with their capability to provide public and private goods at the same level of 
taxes. In an asymmetric information context, governments tend to appreciate the real 
exchange rate to increase the import component of the aggregate supply (AS=GDP+M) 
in order to send a signal of competence and thus increase the probabilities of an electoral 
victory. 
 
All these reasons point to the same direction: it is foreseeable that the real exchange rate 
tend to appreciate before elections and to depreciate after them. The empirical evidence 
in many Latin American supports this hypothesis. However, the relationship between the 
political cycle and the aggregate supply has not been studied so far. 
 
Larraín and Assael (1995, 1997) study the main variables of the Chilean economy in nine 
Presidential terms, finding evidence of the presence of the political cycle in some 
instrumental variables, such as the money supply, the public deficit and the exchange 
rate policy. The authors found significant increases in the money supply and the public 
deficit in the months before the elections, as well as the delay of exchange rate 
adjustments (devaluations of the currency) until the elections have taken place. 
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The Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE), (1999) studies the exchange rate 
policy in Peru form 1940 to 1990. These analysts find that the exchange rate policy is 
frequently used to increase the short-run conditions of the population, specifically, the 
real exchange rate tends to appreciate before elections and to depreciate after them. As 
a result, the political cycle is an important factor in the choosing of the exchange rate 
policy. 
 
Bonomo and Terra (1999) study the behavior of the exchange rate policy in Brazil 
between 1964 and 1997, particularly the trade-off between the reduction of inflation 
caused by the appreciation of the real exchange rate and  the effect on the balance of 
payments provoked by a depreciation. They find significant evidence of the same pattern 
of a real appreciation of the exchange rate before elections and a depreciation after 
them. 
 
Ogura (2000) analyzes the Brazilian economy from 1980 to 1999, finding evidence of 
increases in the growth rate of the GDP, real interest rates and credit supply before the 
elections and increases in unemployment and inflation, as well as a higher rate of 
depreciation of the exchange rate in the months following the electoral processes. 
 
Sibley (2001) employs event study methodology to investigate the impact of presidential 
elections on nominal currency values for a group of 15 Latin American countries between 
1980 and 1996, in which there were 41 elections. The results indicate that presidential 
elections are associated with a statistically significant decline in nominal currency values.  
 
A very interesting finding of the Selby’s work is the fact that the main effects on the 
exchange rate are placed not after the elections, but after the new government takes 
office. “Our empirical results indicate that the greatest currency depreciation tends to 
occur at or shortly following the time of inauguration, which is typically two or four months 
after the election outcome becomes known. This pattern suggests that actions taken by 
the new President may play an important role in many cases” (p. 19). As a matter of fact, 
Sibley uses the 1994 election in Mexico as “prime example” of this pattern. 
 
The results found by Sibley suggest that the stage of the political cycle in emerging 
countries is an important factor influencing exchange rates and should be taken into 
account when making trade and investment decisions. 
 
Stein and Streb (2004) analyze the relationship between the timing of elections and the 
behavior of the exchange rate, specially the decisions to devaluate the currency, a 
measure that has strong political repercussions. The authors study 26 Latin American 
countries between 1960 and 1994, in which there were 242 elections, 131 of which were 
Presidential elections. In each case, the authors observed the behavior of the exchange 
rate in a 19-month period, 9 before and 9 after the elections, considered the month 0. 
 
The study found evidence that in the months 2, 3 and 4 after the elections the 
depreciation rate of the currency is higher than in the rest of the period, which support the 
hypothesis that governments tend to delay devaluations till after the elections in order to 
increase the probability of victory of the party in power. 
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Dreher and Vaubel (2009), investigate a variant of this phenomenon, the effect of the 
political cycle in the international reserves of the country. These authors examine a data 
set of 149 countries between 1975 and 2000, finding evidence that in the period prior to 
elections tend to reduce the amount of international reserves both in relation with the 
domestic monetary base and the gross domestic product. The authors find this pattern 
completely consistent with the hypothesis that central banks tend to sell foreign currency 
in the market in order to appreciate the real exchange rate before elections. 
 
In the case of Mexico, Magaloni (2000) studies the 1976-1997 period. She found 
increases in public expenditures, private consumption and the rate of growth of the 
economy before the elections, and a contraction of the economic activity after the 
elections. She also finds evidence of strategic delays of the adjustments in the exchange 
rate until the elections have taken place. 
 
Grier and Hernandez Trillo (2004) study the political economy factors that may affect the 
real exchange rate in Mexico and The United States, finding that, in the case of Mexico 
elections significantly affect the evolution of the real exchange rate, with an appreciation 
before elections and a real depreciation of the currency after the electoral process. 
 
Gámez (2010) studies the behavior of the real exchange rate between 1970 and 2010 
and identifies a pattern of behavior closely related to the political cycle. The real 
exchange rate tends to appreciate in the months before elections and to depreciate after 
them, especially after the new government takes office.  
 
In the case of the relationship between the political cycle and imports, Colunga and 
Mendez (2010) studied this effect in 15 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
using monthly data from January, 1990 to December, 2009. These authors found 
evidence that, in the months (-3) and (-5), before elections, there are significant 
increases in the imports in the sample studied.  
 
As mentioned before, although there is empirical evidence of the relationship between 
the political cycle and the exchange rate, the analysis of the relationship between political 
cycle and aggregate supply has not been done before. 
 
3. The Real Exchange Rate in Mexico 
 
In the last decades, the nominal exchange rate regimes in Mexico have gone all over the 
complete set of possibilities, from a fixed exchange rate from the 50s until the mid 70s to 
the free flotation, which was established in December, 1994 and remaining to the present 
day. This evolution is shown in the Table 1. 
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Table 1: Exchange rate regimes in Mexico since 1954 
Date Regime 
 
April 19, 1954 – August 31, 1976  
 
 
Fixed Exchange rate  
 
 
September 1st, 1976 – August 5, 1982  
 
 
Controlled flotation  
 
 
August 6, 1982 – August 31, 1982  
 
 
Multiple exchange rate  
 
 
September 1st, 1982 – August 4, 1985  
 
 
Exchange rate  control  
 
 
August 5, 1985 – November 10,  1991  
 
 
Regulated flotation  
 
 
November 11, 1991 – December 21, 1994  
 
 
Crawling peg  
 
 
December 22, 1994 – Present day  
 
 
Free flotation  
 
Source: Banco de México (2009) 
 
However, in spite of the changes on the nominal exchange rate regimes, the real 
exchange rate has followed an evolution more related with the political cycle, especially 
with the changes in presidential administrations. 
 
The Banco de Mexico calculates a Pesos´s Real Exchange Rate Index (PRERI) against 
a bundle of 111 foreign currencies, weighted by the relative importance of the commerce 
of Mexico with each of these currencies.  
 
This index is based 1990=100, and it is available on monthly basis from January, 1970 to 
the present. A decrease of the PRERI means a real appreciation of the peso; on the 
contrary, an increase of the index means a real depreciation of the peso in relation with 
foreign currencies.  
 
The value of the PRERI from January, 1981 to December, 2007 is shown in Graph 1. 
This period includes five elections and changes of administration, those which took place 
in 1982, 1988, 1994, 2000 and 2006.  
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Graph 1: Pesos´s Real Exchange Rate Index (PRERI) 
1981-2007 
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Source: Banco de México 
 
It can be observed a trend of the PRERI to go downwards, which means a trend to 
appreciation of the Peso, this trend is interrupted with sporadic and strong adjustments to 
the rise, which tend to coincide with the electoral years and changes of administration.  
 
In addition to the PRERI, in this work the annual variation of this index (VAR) is analyzed.  
A positive value of VAR mans a depreciation of the real exchange rate, whereas a 
negative value represents a real appreciation of the peso in relation with foreign 
currencies. VAR is shown in Graph 2. 
 
Graph 2: Annual variation of PRERI (VAR) 
1981-2007 
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Source: Banco de México 
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The majority of the observations of VAR lie in the negative section of the vertical axis, 
which represents a secular trend towards an appreciation of the peso interrupted by 
drastic adjustments which tend to coincide with the political cycle. 
The behavior of PRERI and VAR is analyzed at two levels: descriptive and econometric. 
For the statistical analysis the average values of PRERI and VAR are grouped around 
the relevant political cycle dates; that is, election and change of presidential 
administration and are shown in Graphs 3 and 4. Month “0” is the election month, usually 
in July of each election year, and month “5” is the month in which the new President 
takes office, in December of the election year. 
 
Graph 3: Average values of PRERI around elections and changes of administration 
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Graph 4: Average values of VAR around elections and changes of administration 
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  Source: Own elaboration with data from Banco de México 
 
A clear pattern related with the political cycle is observed in both PRERI and VAR. In the 
case of PRERI there is a downward trend from the month (-18) to the month (-5), a 
relative stable pattern between the months (-4) to (4), and a increasing trend from the 
month (5), which is the month of inauguration of the new administration, to the month (8), 
in July of the following year. 
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In the case of VAR, it takes negative values (which mean an appreciation of the peso) in 
the months (-14) to (-5), which are from April of the year before election to February of 
the electoral year. On the contrary, from month (1) to month (17) the peso is depreciated, 
this depreciation being especially strong in the months (6) to (12), which are the first two 
quarters of the year following elections. 
 
In addition to the statistic analysis, an econometric analysis is made to study the 
relationship between the real exchange rate and the political cycle. In order to do that, an 
autoregressive model with dummy variables is used. The dummies are defined for the 18 
months previous to elections, the election month, and the 18 months following the 
elections.  
 
The implicit hypothesis are that the dummies representing the period before elections 
(M(-18) to M(0)) have negative signs, reflecting an appreciation of the peso, and the 
dummies after elections (M(1) to M(18)), have positive signs. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the econometric analysis. Generally speaking, the results 
are congruent with the patterns observed in the descriptive analysis. Significant negative 
coefficients can be observed for the months M(-17), M(-15) to M(-11), M(-9) and M(-6). A 
significant positive coefficient is detected in the month M(6). 
 
Table 2: Econometric results of the analysis of PRERI and VAR 
Variable PRERI VAR
C 1.679588 0.569109
Lag(-1) 0.982318 0.944418
M(-18) 0.060534 1.065915
M(-17) -1.447758 -3.827***
M(-16) -1.370007 -2.225216
M(-15) -1.4750** -2.6020***
M(-14) -0.93279 -3.4111***
M(-13) -1.313*** -2.7833***
M(-12) -2.353*** -4.3312***
M(-11) -0.76056 -2.059097
M(-10) 0.424633 -2.984972
M(-9) -0.762011 -1.90670*
M(-8) -0.767365 -0.46054
M(-7) 0.326792 0.031055
M(-6) -2.1823** -2.9468**
M(-5) -0.824293 1.166001
M(-4) 4.869292 8.650248
M(-3) -0.605295 0.770371
M(-2) -0.555334 0.501498
M(-1) -0.696601 0.514684
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Variable PRERI VAR
M0 -2.4549** -0.662569
M1 3.223377 6.561023
M2 -1.182747 -2.85864*
M3 -0.967427 -1.443811
M4 -0.94199 -0.782062
M5 2.426174 4.535649
M6 7.87496 15.03549
M7 -0.09122 -2.122675
M8 3.208521 -4.552851
M9 -3.823298 -4.933559
M10 -3.15629* -3.62390*
M11 -0.521313 -0.339915
M12 -0.575972 1.431333
M13 -0.675569 -4.756063
M14 0.065775 0.964092
M15 1.32108 2.186128
M16 1.723099 3.218992
M17 -1.8904** -7.33336*
M18 -3.282*** -14.8001*
R2 0.965714 0.906661
Adj R2 0.961143 0.894215
F-stat 211.2494 72.8519
Prob(F) 0 0
 
*Significant at 90% * Significant at 90% ** Significant at 95% 
Source: Elaborated with information from Banco de México 
 
Generally speaking, the signs of the dummy variables are the expected in the months 
prior to the elections, with negative signs and statistical significance in the months M(-15) 
to M(-12). However, in the months after elections the results are less clear. In the case of 
VAR, the coefficient of the dummy M(6) is marginally significant (prob = 0.12). 
 
These results are consistent with those observed in other countries of Latin America and 
we can conclude that in the period under analysis the real exchange rate in Mexico has 
followed a pattern closely related with the political cycle, with appreciations in the last 
months of each Presidential administration, followed by a depreciation, in some cases 
very drastic, in the first months of the new administration. 
 
It is worth noting that this pattern of behavior of the real exchange rate in Mexico 
remained even after the independence of the Banco de México (December, 1993) and 
the introduction of the free flotation regime, in December, 1994 (Gámez, 2010b, 2012). 
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4. The Aggregate Supply 
 
Once stated the relationship between the political cycle and the real exchange rate in 
Mexico, one question that comes to mind is: What is the effect of this pattern in the 
behavior of imports and the aggregate supply of the economy?  
 
The implicit hypothesis is: the appreciation of the peso will, “ceteris paribus” reduce the 
real price of imported goods and, as a result, increase the proportion of imports in the 
aggregate supply, and the aggregate supply itself, in the months before elections and 
changes of administration. In this section this hypothesis is going to be tested. 
 
The information used in this analysis is taken from the INEGI, the official agency of 
statistics in Mexico. This information is available on quarterly basis since the first quarter 
of 1980 to the present.  The variables analyzed here are the annual rates of growth of the 
aggregate supply (AG), imports (M) and the gross domestic product (GDP).  
 
The period analyzed goes from the first quarter of 1981 to the fourth quarter of 2007. As 
in the case of the real exchange rate, the analysis is done at descriptive and econometric 
levels. Graph 5 shows the aggregate supply (AS) and its components: Gross domestic 
product (GDP) and imports (M) for the entire period. 
 
Graph 5: Aggregate supply in Mexico 
1981-2007 
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Source: INEGI 
 
For the statistical analysis the values of the variables are grouped around the election 
and inauguration dates. Elections take place in Q(0),  whereas Q(2) is the first quarter of 
the new administration. The average values of these variables in the period are shown in 
Graph 6. 
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Graph 6: Average values of AS, M and GDP 
 around elections and changes of administration 
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Source: Own elaboration with data from INEGI 
 
The behavior of AS, M and GDP follow a pattern around election and inauguration dates, 
with increases above the average in the quarters before inauguration, particularly in Q(-3) 
to Q(1). This pattern is reversed from Q(2), which is the inauguration quarter, Q83) and 
Q(4), with negative values of the three variables. 
For the econometric analysis, an autoregressive model with dummy variables is used, as 
in the case of the real exchange rate. In this model, 13 dummy variables are defined, six 
for the quarters before elections (Q(-6) to Q(-1), the election quarter Q(0), and six for the 
quarters following elections (Q(1) to Q(6). The hypothesis are that the dummies 
representing the quarters before elections (Q(-6) to Q(0)) will have positive signs, 
whereas the dummies representing the quarters after elections (Q(1) to Q(6)) will have a 
negative sign. The results are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Econometric results of the analysis of AS, M and GDP 
*Significant at 90% * Significant at 90% ** Significant at 95% 
Source: Own elaboration with data from INEGI 
 
Generally speaking, the signs of the coefficients are the expected in the quarters around 
elections and inauguration, especially in Q(-3), which in the last quarter of the year prior 
to elections. In this quarter the signs of the three variables are the expected, being 
significant the coefficients of AS and GDP. In the case of M, the coefficient is only 
marginally significant (Prob=0.1088). 
 
The signs of the coefficient of the dummies after inauguration are also the expected, 
being significant the coefficient of Q(1) for imports and Q(2) for the GDP. In the case of 
the aggregate supply, the sign of Q(2) is only marginally significant (Prob= 0.1092). 
 
These results are consistent with those found in the descriptive analysis, supporting the 
evidence that there is a cyclical pattern associated with the political calendar in the 
aggregate supply in Mexico in the period under study. 
 
5. Conclusions and Limitations 
 
This work presents evidence that there is a pattern associated with the political cycle in 
Mexico in the real exchange rate of the peso in relation with foreign currencies, and this 
pattern is reflected in the aggregate supply of the Mexican economy. 
 
Specifically, there is a real appreciation of the peso in the final months of each 
Presidential administration, followed by a depreciation in the first months of the following 
term, this pattern is reflected in the aggregate supply, by an increase in both the imports 
and the GDP. 
 
These patterns are consistent with those already identified in some other Latin American 
countries. In the case of the real exchange rate, its relationship with the political cycle 
has been studied in several countries, as mentioned before. The relationship between 
Variable Aggregate Supply 
(AS) 
Imports 
(M) 
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 
C 0.009385 0.021616 0.008059 
Lagged(-1) 0.801661 0.803235 0.746118 
Q(-6) -0.011470 -0.075*** -0.002488 
Q(-5) 0.006074 -0.026165 0.009302 
Q(-4) 0.001121 0.008965 0.001039 
Q(-3) 0.0142** 0.069328 0.009736 
Q(-2) 0.003443 0.013281 0.001869 
Q(-1) -0.004661 -0.001663 -0.002154 
Q0 -0.006084 -0.014183 -0.004688 
Q1 -0.022509 -0.10208* -0.011076 
Q2 -0.03211* -0.095006 -0.0190** 
Q3 -0.026999 -0.039185 -0.027032 
Q4 -0.009395 -0.023581 -0.007946 
Q5 -0.000984 0.093440 -0.008620 
Q6 0.024747 0.050776 0.018833 
R-squared 0.729345 0.713838 0.663547 
Adjusted R-squared 0.688159 0.670291 0.612347 
F-statistic 17.70833 16.39255 12.96004 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
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the political calendar and the behavior of imports and aggregate supply has not been so 
extensively investigated. 
 
The identification of a pattern associated with the political cycle in the real exchange rate 
has important implications for the firms operating in Mexico, because it provides 
elements to improve financial planning, hedging, project evaluation and other important 
areas of corporate finance. 
 
One advantage of the political business cycle over other economic phenomena is the fact 
that it follows a regular pattern, and, because of that, it is predictable. Knowing in 
advance the probable behavior of an economic variable allows firms to design strategies 
to protect from it and, eventually to take advantage of it.  
 
In this case, the evidence presented here is especially relevant to firms in the export 
sector, or firms in industries facing competence from imported goods. The anticipation of 
an appreciation of the peso in the final months of each administration with the effects 
associated in the relative price of imports, and the depreciation following the change of 
administration, can provide elements to complement and enrich financial planning, debt 
and hedging strategies in prevention of these factors. 
 
One of the main limitations of this work is that it is confined to a single country; in this 
case, México. However, It is important to emphasize that the implications of the findings 
reported here can be extended beyond the Mexican case.  
 
In countries where the relationship between the political cycle and the exchange rate has 
been already identified (Chile, Brazil, Peru and other Latin American countries), it could 
be expected that this relationship can have effects on the aggregate supply similar to 
those identified in Mexico, with the consequences mentioned above. 
 
Regarding the lines for future research, one could be to extend the analysis of the effect 
of the political cycle on the aggregate supply to other emerging countries, specially to 
those in which it has already been identified a pattern in the  real exchange rate. 
 
Another interesting line of research would be to extend the analysis to the study of the 
aggregate demand (C+G+I+M) around elections and changes of administration. 
According with existent evidence (Gámez, 2010, 2012), one of the sectors most affected 
by the political cycle in Mexico is the building industry, which, in turn, is very important for 
the formation of fixed capital (I). The hypothesis to test would be that the political cycle 
affects the rate of formation of fixed capital, and the implicit costs that this could mean for 
the economy. 
 
Summarizing, the existence of a pattern related with the political cycle in the real 
exchange rate, aggregate supply and imports, and the knowledge of that pattern, can 
contribute to improve the understanding of the Mexican economy, and provide elements 
to the operation, planning and profitability of the firms operating in this country, and 
should be taken into consideration in evaluation and decision making. 
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